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Catastrophe: Risk and Response. By Richard A. Posner. New York:
Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. vii, 322. $28.00 (cloth).
INTRODUCTION
Cassandra is generally regarded as the Greek goddess of prophecy.'
As the legend would hold, the god Apollo, in expression of his divine
love for the beautiful Cassandra, promised to grant her the gift of proph-
ecy in exchange for her hand in marriage.2 After conferring his gift
upon her, she declined his advances and refused to marry him.' Out-
raged, Apollo spat in Cassandra's mouth, revoking from her the ability
to persuade others while preserving in her the ability to foretell. As a
result, Cassandra's ability to prognosticate was rendered worthless, for
no one would believe her prophecies.'
Cassandra's tale is enriched given her inability to persuade others
during the Trojan War. Upon Paris' return to Troy with the lovely
Helen, Cassandra predicted that the abduction of Helen would lead to
the destruction of the seemingly invincible city of Troy; but alas,
Apollo's curse caused no one to believe her prediction.6 Then, after
what appeared to be the culmination of the Trojan War, Cassandra urged
the Trojans to refrain from bringing the infamous Trojan horse inside the
city walls and warned of the armed warriors hiding inside.7 Her proph-
ecy was once again ignored and, as the tale would hold, Troy was con-
quered and Cassandra was awarded to Agamemnon.8 Incidentally, after
1. CHARLES RUSSELL COULTER & PATRICIA TURNER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANCIENT DEITIES
116 (2000).
2. Id. Note that there is an alternative story as to how Cassandra obtained the gift of
prophecy. To celebrate the births of their daughters Cassandra and Helenus, Priam and Hecuba
held a feast in the temple of Apollo Thymbrius. That evening, when Priam and Hecuba left the
temple, they mistakenly left the infants behind. The following morning, the parents returned to
find two serpents licking the sensory organs of the infants. The infants thereafter displayed the
gift of prophecy. PIERRE GRIMAL, THE DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 90 (A.R.
Maxwell-Hyslop trans., Basil Blackwell Publisher 1986) (1951).
3. COULTER & TURNER, supra note 1, at 116.
4. GRIMAL, supra note 2, at 90.
5. COULTER & TURNER, supra note 1, at 116.
6. GRIMAL, supra note 2, at 91.
7. Id.
8. COULTER & TURNER, supra note 1, at 116.
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Agamemnon fell in love with the prophetess, the two were killed by
Agamemnon's incensed wife, Clytemnestra. 9
In our modem American jurisprudence, Richard A. Posner, Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals judge and senior lecturer at the University of
Chicago, has, on at least one occasion, been compared to the Greek god-
dess Cassandra.' ° However, given Posner's latest work, Catastrophe:
Risk and Response (hereinafter Catastrophe), this comparison is poor.
Indeed, as this review will demonstrate, there are a series of striking
dissimilarities between Posner and Cassandra. First, while Cassandra
was cursed with the inability to persuade others of her prophecies, Pos-
ner's lucid writing style in Catastrophe invites persuasion, albeit along
with a great deal of criticism. Catastrophe is the quintessential example
of Posner's uncanny ability to deduce the seemingly difficult study of
law and economics into words, phrases, analogies, and examples that the
lay reader can easily understand without a background in economics.
This communication of an economic analysis of catastrophic risks in a
comprehensible manner is adeptly accomplished with the use of straight-
forward terminology to illustrate the complexities of formulating social
policy in response to low-probability, high-consequence events. Pos-
ner's clear writing style, as evinced in Catastrophe, invites persuasion.
Interestingly enough, Posner has admitted that he purposefully does
not write to persuade others of his point of view; rather, he writes to be
accused.'I Herein lies another striking dissimilarly between Posner and
Cassandra. Although it is highly probable that Cassandra derived little
utility from being perceived as untrustworthy, Posner seemingly enjoys
criticism. He effectuates his arguments by inviting his adversaries to
critique his points of view; although sometimes, Posner's arguments
border on the outrageous. As Larissa MacFarquhar has pointed out:
[Posner's] accounts of the world are sometimes so eccentric as to be
almost Martian. He has argued, for instance, that a higher proportion
of black women than white women are fat because the supply of eli-
gible black men is limited; thus, black women find the likelihood of
profit from an elegant figure too small to compensate for the costs of
9. Id.
10. Robert F. Blomquist has argued that Posner's dissent in Vail v. Board of Education, 706
F.2d 1435, 1449-56 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting), "rings with an Old Testament
ominatio," or a prophecy of evil. Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A.
Posner's First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991 - Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial
Dissenting Style, 69 Mo. L. REv. 73, 98 (2004). Allegedly motivated by "a cathartic need to
express his dissatisfaction with sloppy, inefficient or shopworn legal reasoning," the dissent
supposedly illustrates Posner-the-Cassandra. Id. at 155.
11. Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner; How Did a Judge with Such Subversive Ideas





Given the eccentricity of Catastrophe, it appears that Posner is once
again writing to be accused. The very subject matter of the work - an
exploration of a variety of contemporary cataclysmic risks - surely is
capable of inviting a great deal of criticism. And thus, to this extent,
Posner is not Cassandra. Catastrophe is an invitation to explore public
policy formulation in response to catastrophic risks as opposed to a plea
to be heard.
As the title of this work indicates, while Cassandra was given the
uncanny ability to foretell, Posner does not attempt to sidetrack the
reader with prophecies or visions of doomsday. Nevertheless, the reader
may feel at first glance that Catastrophe emits an aura of prognostica-
tion 13 as the radical subject matter of the work may initially cause the
reader to get sidetracked with imaginations of the apocalypse. Notably,
Posner does not attempt to portray the end of the world as inevitable or
near, but rather utilizes a rational, economic evaluation of catastrophic
risks to guide appropriate hypothetical social policy in response to the
potentially imminent. Additionally, Posner's application of cost-benefit
analysis is the antithesis of the prognosticator's general use of conjecture
and hyperbole. Moreover, prophetic works such as Nostradamus' Cen-
turies were founded upon a pseudoscience akin, in terms of logical
soundness, to that of alchemy or astrology, but Posner's Catastrophe is
not inherently prophetic in nature.' 4 His use of the economic analysis,
as opposed to reliance upon supposed prognostic indicators (such as the
relative position of the stars in the heavens), exemplifies anti-prognosti-
cation. As a result, Posner should be commended for his creative appli-
cation of legal-economic theory to catastrophic risks, but should not be
worshipped by constructing a statue in his honor with a golden tongue.
15
12. Id.
13. 'Prognostication' is used in the sense that that it involves "[a]n act or instance of
prognosticating; a foreknowledge or foretelling of something; a forecast, prediction, prophecy"
characterized by "[a] conjecture of some future event formed upon some supposed sign; a
presentiment, foreboding." 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 588 (J.A. Simpson ed., 2d ed.
1989). And thus, as a result of radical subject matter of Catastrophe, the reader may initially
believe that Posner is practicing the "art" of fortune telling.
14. For a background on Nostradamus' prophecies, see, e.g., EDGAR LEONI, NOSTRDAMUS
AND His PROPHECIES (2000); IAN WILSON, NOSTRADAMUS: THE MAN BEHIND THE PROPHECIES
(2002); ERIKA CHEETHAM, THE FURTHER PROPHECIES OF NOSTRADAMUS: 1985 AND BEYOND
(1985).
15. In honor of his prophetic skills, the Athenians erected a statue with a gilt tongue for the
Chaldean priest Berosus. Amelie Kuhrt, Berossus' Babyloniaka and Seleucid Rule in Babylonia,
in HELLENISM IN THE EAST: THE INTERACTION OF GREEK AND NON-GREEK CIVILIZATIONS FROM
SYRIA TO CENTRAL ASIA AFTER ALEXANDER 37 (Amdlie Kuhrt & Susan Sherwin-White eds.,
1987). Of Berosus' many misconceptions was his belief that the moon was of a half-fiery sphere,
which explained both the moon's light and its phases. Id. at 39.
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In Part I, I focus on the threshold question in Posner's assessment
of catastrophic risks: his use of cost-benefit analysis. Part I identifies
some of the difficulties in applying cost-benefit analysis to catastrophic
risks. Some of these difficulties, such as assigning a value to human
life, are discussed by Posner in Catastrophe. However, Posner fails to
address other problems that accompany cost-benefit analysis, such as
evidence suggesting that regulators actually do not apply cost-benefit
analysis to governmental regulations. Moreover, I suggest that the
application of cost-benefit analysis in Catastrophe evinces a departure,
by Posner, from his support of the traditional legal-economic paradigm
partially in favor of behavioral economics. In Part II, I turn to Posner's
identification of potential catastrophic risks and the appropriate public
policy measures that ought to be taken in response. Although Posner
does propose certain resolutions to hedge the expected value of disasters
in Catastrophe, it is important to note that, according to Posner, his sug-
gested social policy responses are hypothetical and merely intended for
discussion rather than immediate action.
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CATASTROPHIC RISKS
Posner contends that cost-benefit analysis is an important tool in
the formulation of social policy in response to catastrophic risks. It is
generally accepted that under the economic analysis of law, governmen-
tal regulation should act to promote economic efficiency. To promote
economic efficiency, cost-benefit analysis of public policy is inherently
useful as a method for preventing inefficient resource allocation.16 Con-
sequently, theorists and practitioners of the economic analysis of law
subject legal rules and social policies to cost-benefit analysis to assess
the efficiency of social policy measures.17
In Catastrophe, Posner adopts cost-benefit analysis, as well as
some derivatives thereof, to justify hypothetical social policy measures
in response to catastrophic risks. Note that while not directly discussed
in the book, Posner has argued, in a previous work, that "cost-benefit
analysis has positive as well as normative utility" in that it could be used
to explain and predict governmental decisions as well as suggest desira-
ble courses of action. 8 But in Catastrophe, Posner does not address the
fact that cost-benefit analysis may actually lack a positive dimension.
Indeed, regulators may not be in the business of integrating cost-benefit
16. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109
YALE L.J. 165 (1999).
17. Robert P. George, One Hundred Years of Legal Philosophy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1533, 1537-38 (1999).
18. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 121 (2001) [hereinafter FRONTIERS].
[Vol. 59:435
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analysis into social policy measures. Although it is clear that cost-bene-
fit analysis has normative utility, in that it serves the goal of economic
efficiency, it is not clear that cost-benefit analysis can be used to accu-
rately predict governmental decisions.19 For instance, in an article ana-
lyzing the formulation of water policy, Jack Hirshleifer and J. W.
Milliman concluded that policy makers had completely ignored the
advice of economists and had rather embarked on grossly inefficient
schemes for pricing and allocating water when better alternatives were
readily available.20 Governmental authorities did not view themselves
"as mere purveyors of a commodity but instead as crusaders for the
cause of ample and pure water."21 As a result, Hirshleifer and Milliman
suggested that:
the agenda for economists, at this point, should place lower priority
upon the further refinement of advice for those efficient and selfless
administrators who may exist in never-never land. Rather, it should
center upon the devising of institutions whereby fallible and imper-
fect administrators may be forced to learn from error.22
In the aggregate, Posner's application of cost-benefit analysis to cata-
strophic risks ensures efficient resource allocation. However, given the
fact that cost-benefit analysis may lack a positive dimension, it is truly
unclear whether regulators would even attempt to formulate social pol-
icy in accordance with Posner's suggestions in Catastrophe.
Incidentally, while Posner has expressed concern over the validity
of what is known as behavioral economics, 3 or the application of social
science disciplines such as psychology to the study of economics, the
application of cost-benefit analysis to catastrophic risks may also serve
to minimize psychological confusions by regulators. More specifically,
cost-benefit analysis may curb biases in perception and motivation,
which are usually thought as areas of focus under the behavioral eco-
nomics paradigm. 4 To elaborate, the behavioral economics paradigm is
distinguishable from the legal-economic paradigm in that behavioral
economics seeks to aid the economic analysis of law by exposing flaws
in human rationality, which is the postulate of traditional legal-economic
19. But see Adler & Posner, supra note 16, at 167 (claiming that "[g]overnment agencies now
routinely use [cost-benefit analysis]").
20. Jack Hirshleifer & J. W. Milliman, Urban Water Supply: A Second Look, 57 AM. ECON.
REv. 169 (1967).
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id. at 178.
23. See FRONTIERS, supra note 18, at 252-87.
24. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1544 (1998) (citing RISK v. RISK (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995)).
For a series of interesting articles critiquing traditional economic assumptions, see RICHARD H.
THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1992).
2005]
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theory. For example, Cass R. Sunstein, in applying the insights of
behavioral economics has argued that the best justifications for cost-ben-
efit analysis lie in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.25 As
a result, cost-benefit analysis may be justified precisely as a corrective
measure to predictable problems in individual and social cognition.26
"Poor judgments, by individuals and societies, can result from certain
heuristics, from informational and reputational cascades, from thinking
processes in which benefits are 'on screen' but costs are not, from ignor-
ing systemic effects of one-shot interventions, from seeing cases in iso-
lation, and from intense emotional reactions. 127 Thus, in the behavioral
economics paradigm, cost benefit-analysis may not only promote effi-
cient resource allocation, but also encourage sensible decision-making
by curtailing psychological misconceptions.
Posner has expressed concern over the strength of behavioral eco-
nomics in the past and, generally speaking, he apparently considers him-
self to be a traditional legal-economist. For instance, he has argued that
the traditional economic analysis of law is not handicapped by its com-
mitment to rationality, for all humans are capable of choosing the best
available means to the chooser's end.28 And thus, Posner has main-
tained that "[r]ats are at least as rational as human beings when rational-
ity is defined as achieving one's ends (survival and reproduction, in the
case of rats) at least CoSt." '29 But in Catastrophe, Posner appears to be
departing from his rigid support of the traditional economic analysis of
law. Posner asserts that cost-benefit analysis is capable of curbing the
psychological misconceptions that accompany the formulation of social
policy in response to catastrophic risks. He contends that there are a
variety of social and psychological factors that may distort our views on
catastrophic risks. For instance, he argues that people have a difficulty
understanding that science and technology create both enormous risks
and enormous benefits.3° More specifically, it is clear that science and
technology have contributed positively to human welfare, and therefore,
25. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000).
26. Id. at 1059.
27. Id.
28. FRONTIERS, supra note 18, at 252 (accepting the usefulness of behavioral economics but
nevertheless critiquing the behavioral economists' critique that the traditional economic analysis
of law is "handicapped by its commitment to the assumption that people are rational").
29. FRONTIERS, supra note 18, at 253.
30. Posner argues that people generally have a tendency to overestimate the benefits and
underestimate the costs associated with science and technology (p. 116). Indeed, social attitudes
toward the potential harmful effects of technology appear to be mitigated as a result of coherence-
based reasoning.
Ultimately, people make decisions through what appears to be a rational-like choice
in which a strong alternative is straightforwardly preferred over its rival. However,
this dominance is the product of an unconscious cognitive process that reconstructs
[Vol. 59:435
2005] ANTI-PROGNOSTICATION
people are eager to dismiss the intrinsic dangers of science (p. 98). 11 By
recognizing the fact that people are reluctant to give due regard to the
intrinsic dangers posed by science, Posner is implicitly accepting the
central tenet of the behavioral economics paradigm: a thorough under-
standing of human psychology can aid the traditional economic analysis
of law.
Posner further elaborates on other catalysts for our ignorance of
catastrophic risks, many of which are deeply rooted in psychological
misconceptions. For example, scientific doomsters mitigate the per-
ceived risk of catastrophe. "After enough false prophecies of doom,
people stop paying attention" (p. 111).3" Similarly, our ignorance of
catastrophic risks may be the result of scientific lexicon that baffles the
layperson's mind (p. 96). 33 On the contrary, however, Posner also notes
that while many are quick to dismiss the likelihood of catastrophe as
negligible, others may be inadvertently inflating, to our detriment, the
likelihood of catastrophe. For instance, the interrelation between sci-
ence and catastrophe is sometimes irrationally inflated as a result of sci-
and transforms difficult and complex decisions into easy ones by amplifying one
alternative and deflating the other.
Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71
U. CHi. L. REv. 511, 583-84 (2004).
31. Scientific ignorance has been a popular topic of study. As Posner notes, in 1999, a study
found that a large proportion of the United States population was scientifically literate. Jon D.
Miller, Civic Scientific Literacy: A Necessity in the 21st Century, 55 J. FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS 3, 4,
6 (2002) (concluding that "[wle should take no pride in a finding that four out of five Americans
cannot read and understand the science section of the New York Times"). Moreover:
[o]nly a third of American adults know what a molecule is, 39 percent believe that
astrology is scientific, and 46 percent deny that human beings evolved from earlier
animal species. Only 52 percent do not believe in astrology, 50 to 60 percent
believe in ESP, only a little more than half know that it takes the earth a year to
revolve around the sun (some don't know it takes a year; some don't know the earth
revolves around the sun), about a third believe in UFOs, and similar percentages
believe in ghosts and in communication with the dead. It is possible that science is
valued by most Americans merely as another form of magic.
(pp. 93-94) (emphasis original) (internal citations omitted).
32. Take, for instance, Carl Sagan's stance on the potential catastrophic harm that would
result if Saddam Hussein had set fire to Iraq's oil fields during the 1991 Gulf War. Sagan stated:
the net effects will be very similar to the explosion of the Indonesian volcano
Tambora in 1815, which resulted in the year 1816 being known as the year without
a summer. There were massive agricultural failures in North America and in
western Europe, and very serious human suffering and, in some cases, starvation.
Especially for south Asia that seems to be in the cards, and perhaps for a significant
fraction of the northern hemisphere as well.
(p. 111) (quoting Nightline: First Israeli Scud Fatalities; Oil Fires in Kuwait (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 22, 1991).
33. Maybe understanding science is akin to understanding how to pilot a steamboat. See Paul
D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984) (utilizing Mark Twain's Life
on the Mississippi to compare steamboat pilots to lawyers). In such an instance, increased
allocations in education may be an adequate social response to scientific illiteracy.
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ence fiction novels and movies. Instead of drawing serious attention to
risks, as the authors so desire, science fictions novels and movies some-
times unrealistically exacerbate catastrophic risks (pp. 100-10). 3 4 In the
aggregate, Posner's reliance upon psychological factors to explain our
ignorance of catastrophic risks suggests that Posner is implicitly sup-
porting the use of psychology in formulating social policy in response to
catastrophic risks. As a result, Posner appears to be subscribing, at least
partially, to the behavioral economics paradigm.
All things considered, cost-benefit analysis is an inquiry that
reduces decision-making to a simple weighing of expected costs against
expected benefits. Concerning catastrophe however, Posner notes that
the assignment of monetary variables to cost-benefit analysis may be a
difficult endeavor. More specifically, cost-benefit analysis may force us
to contemplate the unthinkable: for instance, to assign a monetary varia-
ble to the value of human life. But Posner offers a practical way to
contemplate the unthinkable in his discussion of the value of life.
35
Posner has argued, in a previous work, that "[m]ost people would
not exchange their lives for anything less than an infinite sum of money
if the exchange were to take place immediately, since they would have
so little time in which to enjoy the proceeds of the sale."36 The corol-
lary, therefore, is not that the value of life is infinite. If the value of life
were infinite, "[t]his would imply that the optimum rate of fatal acci-
dents was zero, or very close to it . . . and it is plain that people are
unwilling, individually or collectively, to incur the costs necessary to
reduce the rate of fatal accidents so drastically."37 Cost-benefit analysis
rarely yields the conclusion that an optimal expenditure requires that the
likelihood of a fatal risk should be reduced to zero. Due to our reluc-
tance to reduce fatal risks to a negligible probability, Posner contends
34. Posner argues that melodramatic films such as Armageddon (1998 Touchstone Pictures),
Outbreak (Warner Studios 1995), The Day After Tomorrow (20th Century Fox 2004), and The
Matrix (Warner Studios 1999) shape our attitudes of potential catastrophic risks (pp. 104-10).
35. Note that Posner's value-of-life analysis is restricted to humans. Consequently, no value
of life is assigned to animals at risk from the loss of biodiversity (other than the animal's intrinsic
market value). See infra Part 11.C.2. Perhaps the value of life analysis should not be restricted
merely to humans. Indeed, a utilitarian analysis has been applied to animal rights. See PETER
SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 1-23 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing, on utilitarian grounds, that the interests
of all animals ought to be weighted equally). The recent advocacy of some scientists to move
humans, chimpanzees and bonobos within a single genus has sparked a moral debate as to whether
all should be treated equally under the law. See Rowan Taylor, A Step at a Time: New Zealand's
Progress Toward Hominid Rights, 7 ANIMAL L. 35 (2001); see also The Jane Goodall Institute, at
http://www.janegoodall.org/default.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). All in all, "[a]nimals feel pain
. . . so that utilitarianism collides with powerful intuitions that our social obligations are ...
greater to human beings than to (other) animals." FRoNrIRs, supra note 18, at 98.





that human life cannot be valued at infinity. 38
Posner suggests a calculation to determine the value of life. He
maintains that the "[d]ivision of the 'price' charged to bear a given risk
by the risk [itself] yields the value-of-life estimate" (p. 165). 39 In other
words, the value of life is computed by dividing the price demanded to
eliminate a death-causing event by the probability that the death-causing
event will occur.
Posner observes that governmental regulations of different risks
produce inconsistent results with respect to value-of-life estimates. For
example, government awards have ranged from "$100,000 for death in
accidents involving unvented space heaters to $92 billion for death from
the herbicides atrazine or alachlor in drinking water" (p. 188).40 His
observation is meritorious. Governmental regulations have lead to
inconsistencies in monetizing human life. A study of seatbelt use found
the value of life to be roughly $370,000,41 while another study examin-
ing the wage differentials received by workers on various hazardous jobs
estimated the value of life at roughly $3.2 million.4 2 Posner notes these
inconsistencies, and argues that estimates on the value of human life are
currently in the range of four to nine million dollars, with a mean esti-
mate of seven million dollars (p. 166). 43
In opposition to previous value-of-life estimates, Posner argues that
38. Gary Becker has taken this analysis one step further and argued that due to the inherent
unwillingness of some persons to reduce risks, such as smoking or driving, all deaths to some
extent can be considered suicide. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 10 (1976) (stating that "deaths are to some extent 'suicides' in the sense that they could
have been postponed if more resources had been invested in prolonging life").
39. See also ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 196-200; FRONTIERS, supra note 18, at
125-27.
40. Posner states that "[t]he differences among the value-of-life estimates probably can be
explained by information costs; by psychological factors such as probability neglect, the
availability heuristic, and the 'dread' factor...; by political factors; and by the asymptotic relation
between risk and the value of life" (p. 188).
41. Glenn Blomquist, Value of Life Saving: Implications of Consumption Activity, 87 J. POL.
ECON. 540, 556 (1979). Note that this sum is in 1978 dollars.
42. Craig A. Olson, An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous
Jobs, 16 J. HUM. RESOURCES 167 (1981). Note that the study was published in 1981. For other
works discussing value-of-life estimates, see ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 197 n.5.
43. Posner cites the work of W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical
Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 5
(2003), which estimates the median value of a prime-aged worker's life in the United States at
seven million dollars. But see G. C. Blomquist, Economics of Value of Life, in 24 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 16133-39 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B.
Baltes eds., 2001) (estimating the mean value of life to be five million dollars). It is important to
note, however, that the value-of-life estimates computed by dividing the price charged to bear a
certain risk by the risk itself may not accurately monetize the value of life, for as Lisa Heinzerling
has argued, these "studies do not measure the ultimate value a person places on her own life; they
measure only the value she places on an increased risk of death." Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting
Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1913 (1999) (correspondence).
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the statistical evidence leaning toward a mean value-of-life estimate of
seven million dollars in the case of catastrophe is misleading. Previous
studies concerning value-of-life estimates were based upon incomes in
wealthy countries, where value-of-life estimates tend to be proportionate
to incomes (p. 167). Furthermore, the risk of extinction from catastro-
phe is generally less likely than the smallest risks evaluated in value-of-
life studies (p. 167). Indeed, the low probability of catastrophe mini-
mizes value-of-life estimates because the relationship between the risk
of death from catastrophe and the perceived cost to mitigate that risk is
not linear.44 For instance, suppose the risk of death is 1/1,000 and the
price demanded to bear such a risk is $7000, then the value of life is
seven million dollars.45 However, what if the risk posed was much
higher? For example, how much would you demand to play the "game"
of Russian roulette, where the risk of death is 1/6?46 Most persons
would insist on an enormous amount of money to assume such a risk,
almost certainly greater than seven million dollars (p. 170). More pre-
cisely, although the risk of death in the game of Russian Roulette is
approximately 167 times greater than that of a 1/1,000 risk of death, the
price demanded to play Russian Roulette will probably not be 167 times
greater than that demanded to bear a 1/1,000 risk; indeed, it will proba-
bly be much greater than $1,169,000. 47
In sum, Posner argues that "most people are content to incur very
small risks for negligible benefits because the likelihood that the risk
will materialize and the benefit thus be snatched away is very slight" (p.
166).48 Due to the low probability of most catastrophic events, as
opposed to the probability associated with risks akin to the "game" of
44. Posner proposes the following equation to illustrate the non-linear relationship between
risk and the value of life:
v = r/(l-r)l°
where
r is the risk
and
v is the value to the average individual of avoiding risk r.
(pp. 166-67).
45. Recall that Posner argues a more accurate valuation of life can be achieved by dividing
the price charged to bear a certain risk by the risk itself, thus 7000 dollars divided by 1/1000
yields a value of life of seven million dollars. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
46. Russian roulette is a "game" in which one bullet is randomly placed in one of six
chambers in the cylinder of a standard revolver. The participating member proceeds to spin the
cylinder of the revolver. The member then holds the gun to his head and pulls the trigger.
Consequently, the probability that the gun is successfully discharged (or perhaps unsuccessfully
discharged if you are the participating member) is 1/6.
47. The product of 167 and $7000 (the price demanded to bear a 1/1,000 risk) is $1,169,000.
48. Posner cites Milton C. Weinstein et al., The Economic Value of Changing Mortality




Russian roulette, Posner conservatively estimates that the value of life in
the case of catastrophe is approximately $50,000 (p. 169).19 He there-
fore conservatively estimates the loss from extinction of the entire
human race to be $600 trillion; although, if every human were to die at
once and without any warning, there would arguably be no loss. 50 It is
counterintuitive to assign a monetary value to the entire human race, for
no one would be around to absorb the cost in the case of extinction.
There is, however, another twist that Posner discusses in valuing
human lives. Notice the impact of present value discounting on the
value of life: a discount rate that is based on market interest rates tends
to trivialize the welfare of future generations (p. 152). For instance,
"[a]t a discount rate of five per cent [sic], one death next year counts for
more than a billion deaths in 500 years" (p. 152).51 Similarly, if we wish
to save one life this year, we ought to "be willing to sacrifice almost 150
lives a century hence" (p. 152). Thus, the effect of present-value dis-
counting on the value of life, and moreover cost-benefit analysis in gen-
eral, is dramatic because "the benefits of the responses are likely to be
spread out over a very long time while many of the costs may have to be
incurred in the present and near future" (p. 151). Indeed, if we were to
treat every potential human life, from now until the sun expands to
incinerate the Earth, as inherently equal, then the effect would be to
reduce the utility of the present generation to a minimal level (p. 153).52
49. Id. at 169. Note, however, that Posner's estimation applies to only the smallest
catastrophic risks. In the case of a catastrophic asteroid collision, as we will see below, the value
of life may be much greater than the conservative estimate of 50,000 dollars.
50. The cost of extinction is the product of the value of life and the adjusted number of
humans (to take into account the utility of future generations). If we give no consideration to
future generations, the cost of extinction is approximately $300 trillion, which is the product of the
current global population of roughly six billion persons and $50,000. However, Posner proposes
that "as a crude adjustment we simply double the figure for the current population and, despite the
[dubious procedure of weighing all future generations equally as the current one], multiply it by
only $50,000" (pp. 169-70). Accordingly, the cost of extinction is the product of twelve billion
persons and $50,000, which yields an extinction cost of $600 trillion (pp. 169-70).
51. Quoting DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984).
52. Adrian Kent complicates the analysis by concluding that the number of people inhabiting
the earth between now and when the sun expands to incinerate the earth is 100 quadrillion (p. 191)
(citing Adrian Kent, A Critical Look at Risk Assessments for Global Catastrophes, 24 RIsK
ANALYSIS 157, 164 (2004)). Notice that Kent's computation does not presume that the population
will continue to grow indefinitely and uncontrollably until our Earth's demise. Current analyses
suggest that the Earth will reach a steady-state population between eleven and thirteen billion in
the next few decades. STEPHEN WEBB, IF THE UNIVERSE IS TEEMING wITH ALIENS . . . WHERE IS
EVERYBODY?: FIFrY SOLUTIONS TO THE FERMI PARADOX AND THE PROBLEM OF
EXTRATERRESTRIAL LIFE 125 (2002). But see World Population in 2300, U.N. Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, U.N. Doc. ESA/WP. 187/Rev. 1 (2004) (stating
that a steady-state population of nine billion persons will not be reached until 2300), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/2004worldpop2300reportfinalc.pdf.
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As a result, Posner concedes that it is relatively unclear how much we
should really care about our remote descendants (p. 118-19).
It is clear that concerns regarding economic efficiency may be ham-
pered if we give too much weight to distant, future generations. Pos-
ner's discussion of present-value discounting is invigorating because he
illustrates that there is no discernable amount of consideration that we
should give to our descendants. I am convinced, from Posner's discus-
sion of present-value discounting, that while altruism may be a virtue,
too much altruism may indeed be a bad thing. Should social policy
reflect the well-being of our children? Probably. What about our
grandchildren? Perhaps. At what point should we cease to give regard
to our ancestors? There may truly be no correct answer. But, it is
important to note that the problems associated with discounting future
lives does not render cost-benefit analysis useless. Although cost-bene-
fit analysis may concededly lack a positive dimension and it may be
difficult to assign a monetizable value to all future generations, cost-
benefit analysis, as demonstrated above, is still an important tool to for-
mulate efficient responses to catastrophic risks. With this background in
mind, we move to the breadth of Catastrophe: Posner's discussion and
evaluation of catastrophic risks.
II. POSNER ON CATASTROPHE
Catastrophe: Risk and Response utilizes cost-benefit analysis, and
some derivatives thereof, as described in Part I to evaluate the cataclys-
mic potential of a variety of catastrophic risks that have more than a
negligible probability of occurrence (p. 21). Posner classifies these cata-
strophic risks as: natural catastrophes or man-made catastrophes, with
the latter broken down into three subgroups: scientific accidents, unin-
tentional catastrophes, and intentional catastrophes (p. 21). Posner's
taxonomy is useful in distinguishing between catastrophic risks for edu-
cational purposes, but as he concedes in Catastrophe, these catastrophic
risks may sometimes act synergistically. For instance, an asteroid colli-
sion (as a natural risk) could interact with global warming (as a man-
made risk) to precipitate catastrophe. As a result, his categorization,
while aiding the reader in classifying and understanding catastrophic
risks, should not be understood as an attempt to isolate all catastrophic




1. PANDEMICS AND FORCE MAJEURE EVENTS
Of the natural catastrophes - pandemics, force majeure events,53
and asteroid collisions - Posner contends that the only catastrophic risk
with truly disastrous cataclysmic potential is that of an asteroid collision.
According to Posner, natural pandemics do not present a major cata-
strophic risk due primarily to modem improvements in medical science
(pp. 23-24). Although recent technological innovations in transportation
have resulted in the rapid spread of once-territorial diseases and the
"promiscuous use of antibiotics" has spurred the evolution of bacteria,
the likelihood of extinction resulting from a natural pandemic is negligi-
ble (p. 23). Posner argues that in an evolutionary sense, pathogens are
generally not suicidal; indeed, Darwinian "[n]atural selection favors
germs of limited lethality" as such germs are more likely to spread to
other hosts if they do not kill their initial host too hastily (p. 23). There
is generally a correlation between the spread of a disease and the length
of the infectious incubation period (p. 22). Despite the fact that natural
pandemics have historically caused a great number of casualties, such as
the Black Plague of the Middle Ages and the Spanish Influenza of the
early twentieth century, humans have managed to survive each pan-
demic (p. 23).
Posner's willingness to dismiss the devastating effects of
pandemics as sub-catastrophic may seem quite extreme. The dichotomy
that Posner creates in Catastrophe by dividing the purely catastrophic
from the sub-catastrophic is apparently one of mere rhetoric. While it is
clearly apparent that Posner is not interested in entirely dismissing the
potential harmful effects of sub-catastrophic events, it is unclear why
Posner initially creates such a rigid dichotomy. Although the dichotomy
created serves the function of limiting discussion to low probability risks
with the potential for cataclysmic harm, it is not clear as to why Posner
would dismiss low probability events that only had the propensity to
kill, for instance, one-quarter of the population, as merely sub-cata-
strophic. Posner's desire to distinguish the catastrophic from the sub-
catastrophic leads to the same concern posed above regarding the social
cost created by extinction of the human race. Were a Posner-defined
catastrophe to occur, eliminating the entire human population, would
there be any social loss? If the answer is no, then perhaps Posner should
have limited his discussion to only sub-catastrophic events, in which
there is a discernable social loss.
53. For the purpose of this review, the term force majeure refers to naturally occurring events
such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
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Posner argues that with respect to force majeure events, technologi-
cal breakthroughs have decreased the likelihood that a volcanic eruption
or earthquake could lead to global catastrophe. Force majeure events,
which pose a potentially higher expected cost than most other cata-
strophic risks, are currently less destructive than before due to our ability
to detect and protect against these disasters.54 Although Posner would
probably not classify the December 26, 2004 tsunami, which caused
widespread havoc to the shores of the south-Asian continent, as a cata-
strophic event, it is clear that force majeure events may nevertheless
impose a great deal of harm upon civilizations. All things considered,
due to technological breakthroughs, the likelihood of the mass extinction
of the human race from a naturally occurring pandemic or force majeure
event is probably less today than in the past.
2. ASTEROID COLLISIONS
Among the natural catastrophes, Posner claims that the catastrophic
risk with the greatest potential for harm is that of an asteroid collision."
It is believed that roughly 250 million years ago, an asteroid collision
resulted in the extinction of ninety percent of the earth's species (p. 25).
Likewise, some sixty-five million years ago, it is believed that an aster-
oid collision may have resulted in the extinction of the dinosaurs,
although paleontologists disagree over the actual cause of extinction (p.
25). The dominant view is that the dust emitted from the asteroid strike
54. Note that the expected cost for both earthquakes and volcanic eruptions is greater than
that of other catastrophes due to the comparatively larger likelihood that such an event will occur
(p. 29).
55. Although noting that contrary authority exists regarding the potential catastrophic risk
posed by a comet collision, Posner disregards the likelihood of such a collision as negligible.
Posner states that "only about 1 percent as many comets as asteroids approach close enough to the
earth to pose a danger of collision" (p. 24). Accordingly, Posner argues that social policy aimed at
protecting the Earth from a comet collision would be inefficient, since:
the function of threat assessment, in regard to catastrophic risks as well as to more
familiar threats, is not only to rank threats by their expected cost but also to fix a
cutoff point below which threats will be disregarded because they would require
attention disproportionate to the social benefits that attention to them would confer.
(pp. 182-83).
In other words, the time diverted to assessing the threat of extremely low-probability events
may impede social reaction to higher probability events (p. 183). Consequently, Posner dismisses
the probability as being too low to warrant consideration. However, according to W. M. Napier et
al., comet strikes represent a major, if not dominant, global impact hazard at the present time.
Dark comets - those comets too dark to be seen with modem astronomical tools (the
counterexample being Halley's Comet) - may pose an enormous catastrophic risk. Current
detection and deflection strategies may not be able to detect or deflect an incoming comet. Alas,
"there exists a large population of extremely dark comets in Earth-crossing orbits, which are
undetectable with current near-Earth object (NEO) search [programs] but are nevertheless impact
hazards." W. M. Napier et al., Extreme Albedo Comets and the Impact Hazard, 355 MONTHLY
NOTICES ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOC'Y 191, 194 (2004).
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impeded photosynthesis and consequently caused the dinosaurs to starve
to death (p. 25). An alternative view supposes that the synergy of dust,
forest fires, and sulfuric acid emitted from the vaporizing of sulfate rock
caused the extinction of the dinosaurs (p. 25). Regardless of which story
is correct, the "real world" effect of asteroid impact is clear. Were a
large enough asteroid to strike the earth, the extinction or near extinction
of the human race could result from a "combination of fire, concussion,
enormous tidal waves, and the blocking for several years of the sunlight
required for crops and other plant life" (p. 25).
Posner supposes that modern technology is ill-equipped to deal
with an incoming, potentially-catastrophic, asteroid. NASA currently
spends roughly $3.9 million annually "compiling its catalog of near-
earth objects," which is a preliminary defense measure against an aster-
oid collision (p. 179). Unfortunately, our lackadaisical current defense
measures grant us only a few seconds to detect an incoming asteroid (p.
26). As a result, Posner strongly suggests that we improve our knowl-
edge of the composition, density, and other properties of asteroids to
help us better understand how to alter their orbits.56
On a global scale, Posner illustrates that cost-benefit analysis indi-
cates that international governments ought to be spending more on aster-
oid detection. The United States is the primary investor in asteroid
defense. Accordingly, global expenditures in asteroid defense amount to
only slightly greater than $3.9 million (p. 180). Applying a value of life
analysis to an asteroid collision, the risk, as estimated by a United King-
dom task force, of an asteroid collision killing 1.5 billion people is one
in 250,000 (p. 180). Part I illustrated that studies regarding risks as
small as one in 100,000 yield a mean value-of-life estimate of approxi-
mately seven million dollars. Noting that the risk of an asteroid colli-
sion is not small enough to justify the conservative value of life estimate
of $50,000, Posner extrapolates that the value of life is nevertheless sub-
stantially less than seven million dollars (p. 180). For the sake of argu-
ment, Posner supposes that the value of life in the case of an asteroid
collision is two million dollars (p. 180). By giving no consideration to
future generations, the annual expected cost of a globally catastrophic
asteroid collision is therefore approximately twelve billion dollars (p.
180). 7 Thus, Posner claims that cost-benefit analysis calls for increased
expenditures to protect against asteroid collisions on a global scale, for
56. Posner proposes that if we were able to gain notice of an incoming asteroid, we may be
able to use missiles tipped with nuclear warheads to destroy it, or alternatively, alter the asteroid's
trajectory with rockets (p. 28). Yet, such solutions are not so simple as an attempt to destroy an
incoming asteroid with a nuclear weapon would result in the creation of a multitude of smaller
asteroids, which increases the probability that a fragment would strike a population area (p. 28).
57. The expected annual cost is the product of the annual probability of an asteroid collision
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an annual expected cost of twelve billion dollars exceeds the current
annual expenditure of $3.9 million by a factor of roughly 3000!
While Posner's calculation regarding the expected cost of an aster-
oid collision is contingent upon probabilities and magnitudes of harm
that the reader is asked to take for granted, Posner's application of cost-
benefit analysis to an asteroid collision illustrates the ability of cost-
benefit analysis to identify social problems that most would be eager to
dismiss as so highly improbable as to not warrant a social policy
response. More precisely, absent cost-benefit analysis, it is difficult to
see that investing in asteroid defense confers a substantial social benefit
that far outweighs expected social loss.
Posner points out that although cost-benefit analysis yields the con-
clusion that greater investments ought to be made in asteroid detection
and prevention (p. 197), the implementation of a global response to the
threat of asteroid collisions may be a difficult endeavor. The United
States, currently the only nation with the technological capacity to build
an asteroid defense system, may be required to step to the fore (p. 127).
Initially, this proposition would lead one to believe that the likelihood of
the United States constructing an asteroid defense system is low due to
the disincentive generally associated with international free riding. This
disincentive, mainly that other nations will derive a benefit from an
asteroid defense system while the United States will be forced to incur
the entire cost, would initially lead one to suppose that the United States
would be hesitant to construct such a system. However, Posner argues
that other nations might be willing to contribute financially to an aster-
oid defense fund, since a common enemy, such as an asteroid, generally
induces nations to cooperate.58 Additionally, the cost of an asteroid
defense system may only be a few billion dollars, incurred over a num-
ber of years. At such a small cost, Posner contends that international
free riding will probably not stop the United States from creating an
asteroid defense system (pp. 127-29).
B. Scientific, Man-Made Catastrophe
1. THE STRANGELET SCENARIO
The strangelet scenario involves the possibility that a particle accel-
erator could produce a strange quark capable of initiating a chain reac-
tion that would inevitably convert all matter into strange matter and
(one in 250,000) and the magnitude of harm (the product of two million dollars per person and 1.5
billion persons).
58. Posner points out that the expected cost of an asteroid collision among nations is
generally uniform. Although larger countries are more likely to be struck by an asteroid, the
smaller countries would likely suffer greater devastation (p. 128).
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consequently mutate the earth into a hyperdense sphere. Physicists are
currently in a "'search for the Holy Grail' of a unified theory of physical
forces" (pp. 133-34). 9 Unfortunately, the physics of subatomic parti-
cles is presently not well understood (p. 30). Physicists at the Relativis-
tic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) at Brookhaven National Laboratory in
Long Island, New York collide and shatter gold nuclei to further their
search for a unified theory of physical forces (p. 31). These collisions
produce an alarming volume of quarks - the basic form of matter consti-
tuting protons and neutrons (p. 31). Of special worry is the possibility,
albeit extremely low, that such a collision might "produce a shower of
quarks that would 'reassemble themselves into a very compressed object
called a strangelet .... [which could], by contagion, convert anything
else it encountered into a strange new form of matter .... [transforming]
the entire planet Earth into an inert hyperdense sphere about one hun-
dred meters across'" (p. 30).60 More specifically:
[i]f such particle were also negatively charged, it would be captured
by an ordinary nucleus as if it were a heavy electron. Being heavier,
it would move closer to the nucleus than an electron and eventually
fuse with the nucleus, converting some of the 'up' and 'down' quarks
in its protons and neutrons, releasing energy, and ending up as a
larger strangelet. If the new strangelet were negatively charged, the
process could go on forever (p. 31).6
1
Thus, the strangelet could theoretically grow "until all matter was con-
verted to strange matter" (p. 31).
Posner believes that the safety regarding the physics behind particle
accelerators is relatively unknown. Initial risk assessors of the Brookha-
ven National Laboratory's particle accelerator speculated that the cata-
clysmic risks associated with particle accelerators were not limited to the
strangelet scenario. Additionally, a catastrophic risk included the possi-
bility that the energies created at the particle accelerator could lead to
the formation of a black hole that would tunnel down from Long Island
to the Earth's center and proceed to devour the planet (p. 31).62 While
the destructive power of the strangelet and black hole scenarios is lim-
59. Posner quotes Paula E. Stephan, The Economics of Science, 34 J. EcON. LITERATURE
1199, 1217 (1996).
60. Posner quotes Sir Martin Rees from MARTIN J. REES, OUR FINAL HOUR: A SctmNTIST'S
WARNING: How TERROR, ERROR AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND'S
FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY ON EARTH AND BEYOND 120-21 (2003) to explain how a strangelet may
occur.
61. Posner quotes John Marburger, the Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory in
John Marburger, Committee Report on Speculative "Disaster Scenarios" at RHIC (Oct. 6, 1999)
(Synopsis of Committee Report), available at http://www.phys.utk.edu/rhip/ArticlesRHICNews/
BNLrhicreport.html.
62. See WEBB, supra note 52, at 129.
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ited to Earth, a universe-threatening scenario involves the possibility that
the Tevatron particle accelerator at Fermilab in Batavia, Illinois, could
trigger the collapse of the quantum vacuum state and destroy all the
atoms in the entire universe (p. 31).63
Posner dismisses the possibility of the collapse of the quantum vac-
uum state as highly unlikely for "if there is intelligent life elsewhere in
the universe, as seems highly likely from the sheer number of planets...
some civilization more advanced than our own would already have built
a particle accelerator as powerful as RHIC, precipitating a phase transi-
tion that would have destroyed the universe" (p. 31). Posner posits, as
did the great physicist Enrico Fermi, that the sheer number of planets
with suitable environments for the development of life, when coupled
with the vast age of our universe, leads to the conclusion that intelligent
extraterrestrial life must exist.6 4 The fundamental premise behind Pos-
ner's dismissal of universe-threatening catastrophic risks may be based
on Fermi's Paradox - the fact that we see no signs of intelligence life
when we might expect to.6 5
Posner offers the following question: with so little known regarding
the inherent safety of particle accelerators, how was Brookhaven given
the proverbial "green light" to construct RHIC? The initial safety
assessment at RHIC was done by a four-member team selected by the
laboratory itself (p. 189). Led by Robert Jaffe, this team consisted of a
theoretician and three particle physicists, all arguably with career stakes
in the success of RHIC (p. 189). The potential benefits to the team were
enormous; if RHIC were to become a success, the team could potentially
share immense benefits "in the form of prestige, career placement, and
personal satisfaction" (p. 189). Thus, self-interested assessors may have
63. See id. at 129-30.
64. Id. at 3-4.
65. Id. at 22. The story behind Fermi's Paradox is quite intriguing. Enrico Fermi, the Nobel
Prize winner in Physics in 1938, was mingling with co-workers during lunch at Los Alamos in the
summer of 1950. Id. at 8, 17. The topic of conversation was the recent flurry of flying saucer
observations. Id. at 17. When the conversation later changed to more mundane topics, Fermi
interrupted the discussion and seemingly out of nowhere asked, "Where is everybody?" Id. at 18.
His co-workers were well aware of the implications of Fermi's statement; indeed, the massive size
and great age of the universe were conducive to the belief that intelligent life must exist elsewhere
in the universe. Id. Fermi went on to make a series of rapid calculations and concluded that the
Earth should have been visited long ago. Id.
Tangentially, Posner dismisses the possibility that extraterrestrials pose a catastrophic risk to
mankind. The risk is negligible for two reasons: first, the distance between habitable planets is
extremely large; consequently, travel among inhabited planets may be impossible (pp. 40-41).
Second (and more relevant to Fermi's Paradox), the possibility exists that extraterrestrial
intelligent beings have already destroyed their civilizations by abusing technological advance (p.
41). Alas, this is a "level we may be approaching" (p. 41).
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tainted the initial safety assessment of RHIC.6 6
Of concern to Posner is that the Center for European Nuclear
Research (CERN) is planning to begin operating a particle accelerator
"that will outdo RHIC in luminosity" - the likeliness for a collision to
occur in an accelerator (p. 32). Also, Brookhaven is seeking to upgrade
RHIC (RHIC-II) by 2010, which would "enable particle collisions with
up to 40 times the luminosity of the existing RHIC" (p. 32). Regardless
of CERN's plan and Brookhaven's proposed upgrade, Posner argues that
cost-benefit analysis of the existing RHIC yields the conclusion that
RHIC ought to be closed, at least temporarily. RHIC's expected life
span is ten years (p. 141). The fixed construction cost of RHIC is $600
million and its annual operating costs are expected to be roughly $130
million (p. 140). With a discount rate of three percent, RHIC's net pre-
sent cost is $1.7 billion, which is the sum of the present-value of the
annual operating costs ($1.1 billion) and the fixed construction costs
($600 million) (pp. 140-41).
The benefits of RHIC have been estimated by Posner to be approxi-
mately $250 million per year (pp. 140). Unlike an asteroid collision,
which incidentally would yield a benefit only to a Malthusian or a maso-
chist, RHIC may confer some utility upon the scientific community
according to Posner. "Particle accelerators have played an important
role in the growth of physical knowledge, knowledge that has in turn
given rise to important products and services, including PET (positron
emission tomography) scans, the ion-implementation method of manu-
facturing integrated circuits, and the development of superconductors"
(p. 143). Although experiments in the near future are unlikely to yield
any monetary benefits, even unsuccessful current experiments confer
utility upon other people inside and outside the scientific community (p.
145). Therefore, with a discount rate of three percent, Posner argues
that the net present stream of benefits of RHIC is $2.1 billion (pp. 140-
41).
Posner states that the lynch-pin of cost-benefit analysis of RHIC is
whether RHIC does indeed pose a catastrophic risk. For instance, posit
that the probability of strangelet scenario is zero." 7 In such an instance,
66. Paradoxically, although the assessment team dismissed the strangelet scenario as fiction,
the team hoped that RHIC would actually yield a strangelet as an experimental result (p. 192).
67. The director-general of CERN commissioned a study into the safety of the Large Hadron
Collider and found the probability of the strangelet scenario to be negligible (p. 193). This
commission dismissed the possibility of the strangelet scenario "[flor as the strangelet expanded,
the strange quarks, because of their density, would sink beneath the surface, which would thus
come to be dominated by the positively charged nuclei" (p. 194). Thus, the strangelet scenario did
not pose a danger because a hypothetical strangelet would conceivably stop growing far before it
mutated the earth (p. 194).
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cost-benefit analysis yields a positive difference of $400 million, for the
net present cost of $1.7 billion is outweighed by the net present benefit
of $2.1 billion (pp. 140-41). However, Posner supposes that the
probability of the strangelet scenario is slightly greater than zero. Pos-
ner presumes, for the sake of argument, that the annual risk of extinction
resulting from the strangelet scenario is one in ten million.6' As men-
tioned in Part I, for extremely low-probability risks (such as the
strangelet scenario), Posner conservatively estimates the extinction of
the human race at $600 trillion. The expected annual cost of extinction
from the strangelet scenario is therefore $60 million - the product of a
one in ten million probability of extinction and the $600 trillion cost of
extinction (p. 141). Taken over ten years the total expected cost of
extinction, discounted to present value, is $500 million (p. 142).
Accordingly, the total expected cost of RHIC, including the expected
cost of extinction, is $2.2 billion (p. 142). Thus, Posner claims that cost-
benefit analysis tips in favor of closing RHIC, for the expected cost of
$2.2 billion exceeds the expected benefit of $2.1 billion by $100 mil-
lion. 69  The obvious critique, however, is whether the appropriate
68. Because RHIC has been operating for four years without precipitating a strangelet
disaster, Posner concludes that there has been no change in the probability of extinction stemming
from the strangelet scenario. As a counterexample, Posner states:
one might predict that the probability that an innocuous-seeming object was a land
mine that would explode when one stepped on it was 1 in 1,000. But if one then
stepped on it once and it did not explode, one would no longer think that the risk of
explosion if it were stepped on again would be 1 in 1,000; the risk would be
reestimated downward, perhaps radically, because stepping on the object was in the
nature of an experiment and yielded highly relevant information.
(pp. 194-95). Posner argues that the risk associated with particle accelerators is different because
"[t]he fact that the first particle collision in RHIC, or the first four years of collisions, did not
result in a strangelet disaster did not falsify the very low probabilities that the concerned scientists
had assigned to such an event" (p. 195). Indeed, the fact that RHIC has been running safely for
four years does not falsify the low probability of the strangelet scenario. However, given Bayes'
Theorem - simply stated, prior probabilities must be updated based on relevant evidence - it can
be argued that the fact that RHIC has not precipitated catastrophe in the past four years has
lowered (even further) the initial probability assigned by assessors. See THOMAS BAYES, AN
ESSAY TOWARDS SOLVING A PROBLEM IN THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES (1763).
69. The costs, including the risk of extinction, are the construction costs ($600 million)
summed with the operating costs ($1.1 billion) and the expected cost of extinction ($600 trillion
multiplied by 10-7), which is $2.2 billion. The benefits remain as the present value of RHIC's
stream of annual benefits ($2.1 billion).
In the case of RHIC-Il, Posner concedes that cost-benefit analysis may be an inadequate
threshold inquiry because the relevant probabilities, costs, and benefits are difficult to ascertain.
Posner therefore advocates the use of the tolerable-windows approach - a method recognizing that
we may know enough about the benefits and costs, even when uncertainty exists, to be able to
create a 'window' of acceptable expenditures (p. 184). The utility of the tolerable-windows
approach lies in the fact that it ensures that "neither grossly inadequate nor grossly excessive"
measures are taken when ambiguity exists (p. 184). Posner concludes that if the tolerable-
windows approach is applied to RHIC-Il, then RHIC-II should be postponed for a period of time
ANTI-PROGNOSTICATION
probability has been inserted into cost-benefit analysis. If the
probability is indeed correct, Brookhaven ought to be shut-down. Con-
versely, if the probability has been marginally inflated, then cost-benefit
analysis leads us to the conclusion that Brookhaven should continue
operating, given the potential for catastrophe. All things considered,
Posner states:
[w]e shall almost certainly survive another six years of RHIC, and the
Large Hadron Collider as well, but what is next? Many scientists are
unsure about the future direction of such research. And remember
RHIC-II, which Brookhaven hopes to begin operating in 2010 and
which will have 40 times the luminosity of RHIC. One hopes that
before a decision is made on the funding request, the proposed
upgrade will be subjected to a careful cost-benefit analysis by neutral
experts (p. 196).
2. THE GRAY-GOO PROBLEM, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PLANTS AND
ANIMALS, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Nanotechnology is the technology of the future. Nanotechnology
may one day enable the economical manufacturing of computer chips
the size of molecules. Nanotechnology envisions nanomachines -
machines measured in billionths of a meter - capable of self-assembly
that "will allow us to place components and assemblies inside cells and
to make new materials using the self-assembly methods of nature" (p.
36).70 Self-assembly is the essential characteristic of nanotechnology;
nanosized machines are too small to be economically created by build-
ing them one-by-one (pp. 35-36). All in all, "[f]uture nanotechnologists
will have the ability to assemble custom-made molecules into large,
complex systems; their capacity to create materials will be almost
magical."71
Note the juxtaposition of self-assembly and self-replication. The
former is the process "in which small, relatively simple parts combine to
form somewhat more complex structures," while the latter is the process
"in which a complex system reproduces itself' (p. 36). Self-assembly
may not pose a cognizable catastrophic risk, while the catastrophic risk
(p. 185). The postponement of RHIC-Il would allow physicists to do more research, adding a
margin of safety (p. 186).
70. Posner quotes from the Introduction to Nanotechnology for Non-Specialists, which is
found in THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON NANOSCIENCE, ENG'G & TECH.,
NANTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH DIRECTIONS: IWGN WORKSHOP REPORT XXV (M.C. Roco et al. eds.
1999). For a discussion of nanomachines, see, e.g., Robert A. Freitas, Jr., Nanomedicine, Vol.
IIA: Biocompatibility (2003); Robert A. Freitas, Jr., Nanomedicine, Vol. I: Basic Capabilities
(1999); K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology (paperback
reprint 1987) (1986).
71. WEBB, supra note 52, at 126.
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associated with self-replication is readily apparent. Hypothetically, if a
nanobot with the power of self-replication were to escape into the envi-
ronment, the nanobot could reproduce exponentially until it had con-
sumed all living material (p. 36). The nanobot could be more
omnivorous than any bacterium, and under ideal conditions, convert the
"environment we see today into a sea of ravenous nanobots plus waste
sludge."72 This potential catastrophic risk is known as the gray-goo
problem (p. 36). 73
Posner dismisses the risk associated with the gray-goo problem
because nanotechnology lies in the distant future and therefore we have
a great deal of time to learn more about nanotechnology. Once we have
gained the appropriate level of information, we can respond to the risk
posed. Furthermore, preemptive measures have already been taken in
response to the gray-goo problem; nanotechnologists have issued
"guidelines limiting the power supply for nanomachines to power
sources that, unlike sunlight, are not found in the natural environment"
(p. 36).
Posner states that genetically modified plants and animals pose a
similar catastrophic risk to that of nanotechnology. With respect to
genetically modified plants, the hybridization of weeds with crops
through genetic splicing may lead to catastrophic results (p. 38). Weeds,
in general, have an uncanny ability to replicate, a property that threatens
the well-being of other plant life (p. 38). One catastrophic risk is the
potential for weed genes to escape "into the natural flora of the same
species, causing the natural flora to become destructively aggressive and
herbicide resistant" (p. 38). Likewise, genetically modified animals,
such as salmon, have the ability to escape into the wild. The danger of
genetically modified animals is that they may be able to "outcompete
and destroy native species" (p. 38). However, cost-benefit analysis
argues for a continuation of genetically modified crops, since they pro-
vide immense benefits and their inherent dangers are unlikely to materi-
alize (p. 135).
Posner argues that genetically modified salmon are to native
salmon as robots enabled by artificial intelligence are to humans. In
other words, just as genetically modified salmon may be Darwinian
superior to native salmon, robots enabled with artificial intelligence
may, one day, be Darwinian superior to humans. Posner has indeed
identified an area of concern, for artificial intelligence has greatly
expanded over the years and no end appears to be in sight. The potential
power of artificial intelligence is illustrated by the publicized chess




matches between chess-champion Garry Kasparov and IBM's Deep
Blue. In 1996, Deep Blue, currently the greatest chess-playing computer
ever constructed, defeated Kasparov in the initial chess match of their
six game series, but eventually lost the series to the mortal chess cham-
pion. 4 However, in 1997, Deep Blue exacted revenge and defeated
Kasparov in a six-game series by a score of 3.5 - 2.5. IBM's Deep
Blue had achieved a milestone victory over the world's human chess
champion.
As Posner states, "[tihe game of chess is modeled on war" (p. 41)
and therefore it is not a stretch to assume that "[r]obots several genera-
tions from now may be able to beat any nation in a war" (p. 41).76 Just
as Deep Blue's algorithm was effectively programmed to defeat a mortal
in the game of chess, a robot may one day be programmed with an
algorithm capable of enslaving or destroying the human race (p. 42).
Posner mitigates this risk by arguing that "[tlhe problem of creating a
computer with the capability of the human brain is not the hardware but
software" (p. 42). I am not completely certain that Posner is correct
with this assertion. With the onset of DNA computing in the horizon,
Posner may be correct in assuming that the problem of mimicking the
human brain may not be the hardware (or, at the very least, will not be
the hardware in the very near future). However, innovations in artificial
intelligence indicate that we may be closer than we think in our quest to
recreate the human mind algorithmically via computer software.
While Posner may disagree, the cataclysmic power of artificial
intelligence may not depend on preconceived notions of consciousness,
which many humans believe is a unique human trait. Although robots
capable of self-sufficiency are yet to be created, the works of Alan Tur-
ing and Hans Moravec illustrate that artificial intelligence and human
intelligence may not be as divergent as once thought. According to the
74. Jonathan Schaeffer & Aske Plaat, Kasparov versus Deep Blue: The Re-match, 20 INT'L
COMPUTER CHESS ASS'N J. 95 (1997), available at http://www.cs.vu.nl/-aske/db.html. For a
review of Deep Blue's stunning defeat of Kasparov in game one of their 1996 chess series, see
Bruce Weber, In Upset, Computer Beats Chess Champion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at A32.
75. Schaeffer & Plaat, supra note 74.
76. Posner notes that the analogy between chess and war is imperfect because resource
constraint does not exist and there are only a limited number of possible moves in the game of
chess. However, Posner does not note a further difference between chess and war: unlike war,
chess is a game in which both sides have perfect and complete information (p. 41). Due to the
characteristically asymmetric state of information in war, the game of poker may be more
analogous to war than chess. In the game of poker, where information is not readily available to
all parties, poker-simulating machines - such as Darse Billing's and Jonathan Schaeffer's Loki
(named "after the Norse god of mischief and chaos") - "still [have] a long way to go before [they]
can realistically challenge a living, breathing no-limit [poker] expert." JAMES MCMANUS,
POSITIVELY FIrFH STREET 111 (2003). Similarly, machines "may have a long way to go" before
they can realistically challenge humans in the "game" of war.
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mathematician Alan Turing, the human brain is a discrete state machine
- a machine that falls within the scope of the mathematically computa-
ble and thus able to be written as an algorithm.77 "[E]very feature of the
brain relevant to thought can be captured by a table of behaviour, and so
emulated by a computer."7 8 For example, in 1950, Turing devised a test
in which participants were asked to discriminate between samples pro-
duced by a human and samples produced by a computer.7 9 The test was
employed:
to determine with what frequency people are unable to discriminate
between sample output from human beings and sample output from
computing machines. If the test results show that the frequency with
which the test's subjects can discriminate between the human output
and the machine output is statistically insignificant, then the fact that
they cannot discriminate between these outputs would (it is asserted)
mean that it is right to say that there is no (essential) difference
between a 'thinking' human being and such a sophisticated piece of
robotics, and also, therefore, that it is right to say that the latter is as
much capable of 'thinking' as the former (insofar as the outputs are
of the sort which, when produced by human beings would be said to
involve 'thinking').8o
Turing concluded, under this infamous test, that "[i]f a machine cannot
be distinguished from a human being under these conditions then we
must credit it with human intelligence."'"
Presumably building upon Turing's intuitions, Hans Moravec has
concluded that robots will match human intelligence in less than fifty
years.82 Moravec has argued that barring a cataclysm, "the development
of intelligent machines [is] a near-term inevitability. ' 83 More specifi-
cally, we should expect the artificial intelligence industry to produce
computers capable of reasoning by 2030 or 2040 "that in some ways
resemble us [as humans], but in others are like nothing the world has
77. ANDREW HODGES, TURING: A NATURAL PHILOSOPHER 34-35 (Ray Monk & Frederic
Raphael eds., 1997).
78. Id. at 36.
79. Dennis Patterson, Fashionable Nonsense, 81 TEx. L. REV. 841, 883-84 (2003) (reviewing
VINCENT DESCOMBES, THE MIND'S PROVISIONS: A CRITIQUE OF COGNITIVISM (Stephen A.
Schwartz trans., 2001)).
80. Id. at 883 n.258 (quoting GRAHAM BUTrroN ET AL., COMPUTERS, MINDS AND CONDUCT 13
(1995)) (alteration in original).
81. HODGES, supra note 77, at 37-38.
82. HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 23 (1999). For a
review of Moravec's publications, see Hans Moravec's home page, at http://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/
-hpm/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2005).
83. Hans Moravec, Robots, Re-Evolving Mind (2000), available at http://
www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/-hprnproject.archive/robot.papers/2000/Cerebrum.html (archived project,
Robotics Institute, Carnegie Mellon University).
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seen before."84 All in all, the works of Turing and Moravec illustrate
that the human mind may not be that difficult to recreate via computer
software. Thus, Posner may be overestimating the difficultly of pro-
gramming software that mirrors the human mind.
Posner proposes, inter alia, institutional and educational reforms to
ameliorate the catastrophic risk posed by artificial intelligence.85 Our
current American legal system is poorly equipped to deal with scientific
risks (p. 199). Alas, the legal profession itself is not contributing posi-
tively to the management of catastrophic risks (p. 200-09). As an insti-
tutional reform, Posner proposes that additional requirements be
imposed upon law students to surmount the cultural barrier between law
and the physical sciences (p. 203).86 For instance, Posner claims that
law students could be required to show proficiency in one of the natural
sciences. To support this claim, Posner states, "[1]aw is more like a
language than a science. It is important to know the rules of a language
as codified in a grammar, lexicon, and textbook, but that knowledge is
only the first step in learning how to use the language" (p. 202).87 This
position is odd given Posner's desire to condense legal education into a
two-year curriculum. 88 Previously, Posner argued that legal education
should be modeled on the two-year MBA awarded by business schools
because "the practice of law is becoming more like a business at the
same time that law school is becoming less like a business school and
more like a graduate department."89 Posner does not offer cost-benefit
analysis with respect to lengthening legal education, which initially
should make this radical proposition suspect in the eyes of the legal-
economist. Regardless, by requiring proficiency in one of the natural
84. Hans Moravec, The Universal Robot (1991) (archived project, Robotics Institute,
Carnegie Mellon University), available at http://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/-hpm/ project.archive/
robot.papers/1991/Universal.Robot.910618.html.
85. Contra WEBB, supra note 52, at 127 (relaying Isaac Asimov's favored observation that
"when man invented the sword he also invented the hand guard so that one's fingers did not slither
down the blade when one thrust at an opponent"). Following Asimov's intuitions, institutional
and educational reforms may not be necessary, for it is implied that humans have the
technological prowess to respond intellectually to risks - such as formulating a response to the
risk of lacerating one's hand when one thrusts a sword at an enemy.
86. Posner's proposed educational reforms are reminiscent of the radical reforms in legal
education by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School. See WILIAa P. LAPANA,
LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION 55-78 (1994). For a brief
glimpse of Langdell's important role in shaping American legal history, see GRANT GILMORE, THE
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42, 41-48 (1977) (stating, as a tribute to Langdell's greatness, "if
Langdell had not existed, we would have had to invent him").
87. Emphasis omitted. For an analogous argument pertaining to the lexicon of the American
legal system, see Carrington, supra note 33 (discussing the lexicon of the steamboat profession as
akin to the lexicon of the legal profession).
88. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 281-95 (1999).
89. Id. at 285.
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sciences, it is clear that legal education would then take the shape of a
graduate department as opposed to a business school. By implication,
instead of shorting legal education to a two-year curricula as previously
argued, Posner is advocating for an extension in the duration of legal
education.
As an interrelated institutional reform, Posner advocates for the cre-
ation of a science tribunal of original jurisdiction - a court composed of
judges each educated in one of the physical sciences (p. 209). A science
tribunal of original jurisdiction would be composed of judges who vol-
unteered to take on cases (p. 211). Further, the lawyers themselves
could request to be on the science docket (p. 211). Sadly, our current
courts are composed of random jurors and generalist judges - whose
discretion is generally limited to the issues at trial (p. 212-13). The law-
yer's sole commitment is not to scientific truth; rather, the lawyer's main
concern is her client (p. 202). Moreover, lawyers coach experts and wit-
nesses "to maximize their contribution to 'the team"' instead of search
for the truth (p. 212). Posner thus proposes that a science tribunal
would:
dispense with juries and with the standard method of witness interro-
gation. It would instead have the judge - who would be the sole trier
of fact and would be expected to have some minimum competence in
the relevant science - sitting at a round table with scientists selected
by some neutral procedure ...and discussing the scientific in the
case with them (p. 213).
This method of eliciting facts would mirror the continental European
adversarial approach (p. 213).
Posner's discussion of the necessity of a science tribunal illustrates
an overarching problem in the legal system - mainly, that the courts are
not in the business of finding "the truth." Personally, I believe that law-
yers act (or ought to be acting) in the best interests of their clients, as
opposed to searching for "the truth." Expert witnesses are bought and
sold. After enough searching, an expert can declare "the truth" upon the
courtroom (for the right price of course). To this extent, Posner is cor-
rect in arguing that law and science need to merge to develop uniform-
ity. Indeed, there is a sharp distinction between law and the natural
sciences; law is concerned with action while the natural sciences are
oriented toward knowledge (p. 202).90 Thus, the creation of a science
tribunal of original jurisdiction would aid in our epistemological search
90. Cf LAPANA, supra note 86, at 29-54 (stating that antebellum legal theory traditionally
characterized law as a natural science, which, if consistently pursued, would lead to a rational
understanding of the legal universe and reveal the nature of the mind of the world's creator).
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and would help to curb systemic imperfections to aid in the formulation
of adequate responses to catastrophic risks posed by scientific accidents.
C. Unintended, Man-Made Catastrophe
1. GLOBAL WARMING
Global warming is probably the most salient catastrophic risk.
"[C]arbon dioxide and other 'greenhouse gases' such as methane . . .
make the earth habitable" (p. 44). Greenhouse gases allow sunlight to
reach earth through the atmosphere; however, they also trap "heat radi-
ated skyward from the earth's surface" (p. 44). Indeed, without green-
house gases, our planet would be extremely cold (p. 44). Posner claims
that since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the volume of green-
house gases emitted by the burning of fossil fuels has increased dramati-
cally (pp. 44-45). Moreover, deforestation - generally accomplished by
burning sections of a forest - not only emits carbon dioxide as a
byproduct of the burning of trees, but also hampers the ability of vegeta-
tion to absorb carbon dioxide via photosynthesis (p. 45).
Posner states that the effects of extreme global warming may be
cataclysmic.9" As the atmosphere holds greater levels of greenhouse
gases, the earth's climate warms. As a secondary effect, water vapor has
a greenhouse effect. If water vapor remains dissolved in the atmosphere
instead of returning as precipitation to the earth's surface, the atmos-
phere warms, increasing its water-retention capacity and strengthening
the effects of other greenhouse gases (p. 44). William Nordhaus, the
leading economic expert on global warming, has argued that global
warming may lead to:
a sea-level rise of 20 feet or more; unexpected shifts in ocean cur-
rents, such as displacement of the warm current [the Gulf Stream]
that warms the North Atlantic coastal communities; a runaway green-
house effect in which warming melts tundras and releases large
amounts of additional GHGs [greenhouse gases] like methane; large-
scale desertification of the current grain belts of the world; very rapid
shifts in temperature and sea levels; or the evolution and migration of
lethal pests in new climatic conditions (p. 46).92
91. Posner borrows a helpful and illustrative analogy to the potential harmful effects of global
warming: global warming as leaning in a canoe. "'[L]eaning slightly over the side of a canoe will
cause only a small tilt, but leaning slightly more may roll you and the craft into the lake"' (p. 46)
(quoting R. B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, 299 SCIENCE 2005, 2006 (2003)). Alas, a
small change in any environmental variables, such as rainfall, could trigger potentially
cataclysmic results (p. 48).
92. Posner quotes WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 114 (1994) (omissions in original) to describe some possible
consequences to global warming.
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Known as the runaway greenhouse effect, warmer temperatures could
cause the melting of permafrost and glaciers, which would release
greater amounts of the greenhouse gas methane (p. 47). Such an effect
could potentially lead to the phenomenon known as snowball earth, the
increased cloud cover as a result of a strong concentration of greenhouse
gases in our atmosphere would cause entering sunlight to be reflected,
leading to a dramatic fall in temperatures (pp. 47-48). Although the
notion of a snowball earth is controversial, it is reasonable to expect that
the melting of the polar ice sheets would leave most coastal regions
flooded and uninhabitable (pp. 46, 48). Even more problematic, how-
ever, is the effect of global warming on the Gulf Stream. The dense,
salty water of the Artic deflects warm water east toward Europe (p. 47).
If the dense, salty water of the Artic was diluted as a result of the melt-
ing of the north polar ice cap, the warm water of the Gulf Stream would
not be deflected toward Europe. Instead, it would continue into the Arc-
tic, transforming Europe's climate into that of Siberia (p. 47).
There are, however, many uncertainties as to the catastrophic
effects of global warming. The very causes of global warming may con-
fer net benefits to our planet. For instance, deforestation increases the
amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere which then stimulates the
growth of vegetation in the remaining forests (p. 50). As a result, it is
entirely feasible that global warming may actually cause a net increase
in vegetation (p. 50). Additionally, according to Laurence Pringle, air
pollution may have a cooling effect and consequently reduce atmos-
pheric temperatures (p. 50). 9 3 Furthermore, a thawing of the Arctic sea-
ice may improve ship accessibility, which may have major positive
implications on the global economy.94 Perhaps most radically, con-
servative extremists such as S. Fred Singer have argued that no credible
evidence of catastrophic global warming exists as carbon dioxide levels
"have been many times higher in the past than today's value without
causing irreversible climate catastrophes" (p. 55).95 Singer concludes
93. Posner cites LAURENCE PRINGLE, GLOBAL WARMING: THE THREAT OF EARTH'S
CHANGING CLIMATE 21-22 (2001), who asserts that previously aerosol particles in particular
cooled the atmosphere offsetting the heating effects of other air particulates.
94. SUSAN Joy HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 82-85 (2004). It should be noted that the opening of new shipping routes around the
Arctic Basin would also confer a substantial risk upon international relations for it is foreseeable
that nations would battle over the usage of the Arctic passageway. Furthermore, natural marine
mammal migration would be altered by the dynamic Arctic sea-ice. Melting could also alter the
contour of existing Arctic shipping lanes, which may pose additional problems to the shipping
industry.
95. See, e.g., S. FRED SINGER, CLIMATE POLICY - FROM RIO TO KYOTO: A POLITICAL ISSUE
FOR 2000 - AND BEYOND, (Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Essays in Public




that global warming may be a very gradual phenomenon that could con-
fer, over time, net benefits to society; although according to Posner,
Singer's reasons proffered are difficult to evaluate (p. 54). All in all, the
potential costs of global warming may be overstated.
Posner treats the catastrophic risk posed by global warming with
delicacy, for there are many difficulties surrounding the application of
cost-benefit analysis. Currently, Posner argues that there are too many
doubts regarding the catastrophic risk posed by atmospheric pollution
and deforestation. He contends that we remain uncertain as to the poten-
tial devastating effects, including the time frame in which such a transi-
tion would take place, with respect to global warming. If global
warming were an abrupt phenomenon, taking place over the course of a
decade or so, it would be impossible to relocate agriculture and cities (p.
46). Further, polar and tropical species of plants and animals tend to
only be adapted to a small range of temperatures (p. 63). Hence,
because "[t]he human impact on the climatic equilibrium is inherently
unpredictable," scientific study of global warming does not offer precise
and accurate conclusions (p. 53).
With all of the uncertainties regarding the potential catastrophic
effects of global warming, Posner claims that cost-benefit analysis is
incomplete because no discernable probability can be attached to the risk
posed by global warming (pp. 49-50). As a result, Posner assumes that
there cannot be an expected cost attached to global warming.9 6 Posner
also notes that there is a problem with respect to present-value discount-
ing, for the benefits of curtailing the catastrophic effects of global warm-
ing lie in the distant future, while the costs are immediate. As a result,
price-value discounting leads us to undesirable results (pp. 150-55).
Although Posner contends that cost-benefit analysis is an inadequate
threshold inquiry in the case of global warming, he believes that it does
not necessarily follow that we should do nothing about the potential cat-
astrophic consequences of global warming. Even if we are unable to
attach a probability to global warming, there is a risk, albeit indis-
cernible, that once global warming hits "the point of no return," we will
be unable to abridge its harmful effects and catastrophe will be eminent.
It is against this incomputable risk - the risk of abrupt global warming -
with which Posner is concerned (p. 163-64)
Posner argues for systemic checks, such as an emissions tax and
technology forcing, to curb the potential catastrophic effects of global
warming (p. 155-65). Notice "that because greenhouse-gas emissions
are not taxed (or classified as pollutants), the private incentives to reduce
96. This point is rather controversial, given the subjective Bayesian proposal that objective
probabilities may be altered based on relevant evidence. See supra note 68.
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them are meager" (p. 159). A technology-forcing emissions tax would
create "powerful market pressures to speed the development of econom-
ical alternatives to fossil fuels as energy sources" (p. 157). Moreover,
an emissions tax would establish an incentive for technologies that
sequester carbon dioxide (p. 157). "An emissions tax may be efficient to
the extent that the demand for fossil fuels both is inelastic in the short
run... and reduces the long-run costs of curbing greenhouse gases by
accelerating the development of clean fuels and efficient methods of car-
bon sequestration." (p. 159). As a result, if carbon sequestration tech-
nologies were to become economically feasible, and the major emitting
countries imposed substantial emissions taxes, it is foreseeable that
greenhouse emissions could be reduced to zero.
Posner further suggests that the formation of an international envi-
ronmental protection agency under the auspices of the United Nations
would act to curtail the harmful effects of global warming (p. 216). Pos-
ner's suggestion, albeit a rational response to correct the prisoner's
dilemma of international capitulation in formulating a global response to
the catastrophic risk posed by global warming, does not give due regard
to current developments in environmental legislation.97 Indeed, recent
developments in California have led me to question Posner's suggestion
that the creation of an international body is truly necessary, or in the
event that such body is created, will even be effective. To begin, notice
the relationship between automobile emissions and global warming.
Automobile emissions currently constitute twenty-seven percent of all
global greenhouse emissions. 98 In response to the harmful effect of
automobile emissions on global warming, ex-California Governor Gray
Davis, on July 22, 2002, signed Assembly Bill 1493 which contained
legislation aimed at curbing the potential catastrophic effects of global
warming via strict greenhouse gas emissions standards for cars and
light-trucks. 99 Assembly Bill 1493, an act to amend California Health
and Safety Code Section 43018.5, delegated to the California Air
97. See infra notc 118 (discussing the prisoner's dilemma).
98. In 2001, emissions from electricity accounted for thirty-three percent of greenhouse
emissions; transportation accounted for twenty-seven percent; and industry accounted for nineteen
percent. The remaining twenty-one percent was contributed by residential, agriculture, and
commercial sectors. U. S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990-2001 ES-7 (2003), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwanning.nsf/
content/ResourceCenterPublicationsGHGEmissionsUSEmissionslnventory2003.html. Although
automobile emissions account for roughly twenty-seven percent of all greenhouse emissions
globally, "[p]assenger vehicles and light-duty trucks are responsible for approximately 40 percent
of the total greenhouse gas pollution in the state [of California]." 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 200
§ l(6)(e) (A.B. 1493) (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2002)).
99. See 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 200 A.B. 1493) (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2002)).
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Resources Board the authority to issue regulations controlling green-
house emissions by cars and light-trucks.' 00 These regulations for con-
trolling emissions would apply to automobiles issued in the 2009 model
year.101
Domestically, section 43018.5 may have a substantial effect on
automobile manufacturing. California is the single most important
domestic automobile market, accounting for ten percent of all new auto-
mobile sales in the United States. 11 2 "Given ... the more immediately
pressing need to produce vehicles that can comply with the exacting
emissions standards of California[ ], several of the world's car makers -
notably Ford, DaimlerChrysler and Honda - are studying fuel cells."10 3
Due to California's immense automotive market, its "stringent emissions
control policies [are] particularly acknowledged [somewhat mockingly]
as imposing a 'fuel penalty relative to automobiles subject to the 49-
State standards.""'1° 4 "If other states copy California's law.., that could
set off a domino reaction from Seattle to New England, forcing the
entire U.S. car fleet to achieve greater gas mileage in the next dec-
ade."'0 5 California's environmental-friendly laws "could fundamentally
alter vehicle design and stimulate nationwide reductions in greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions."'
10 6
If California's emissions standards were to survive domestic judi-
cial scrutiny, a global chain reaction could potentially occur.'0 7 Califor-
nia alone is the fifth-biggest economy in the world!'0 8 International
automobile manufacturers, pressed not to lose California's market or the
United States' domestic market (regulated de facto by California's emis-
100. Section 43018.5(a) of the California Health and Safety Code provides: "No later than
January 1, 2005, the state board shall develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum
feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2002).
101. "The regulations ... shall apply only to a motor vehicle manufactured in the 2009 model
year, or any model year thereafter." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(b)(1) (West 2002).
102. Id.
103. Replacing Gas with a Gas, ECONOMIST, July 21, 2001.
104. Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California's Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 699, 736 (2003) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-340, at
87 (2002)).
105. Paul Rogers, California Could Set Trend with Tougher Gas Mileage Standards, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 15, 2002, at 1.
106. Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Comment, California's Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel
Economy Preemption Curb California's Air Pollution Leadership?, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 893, 896
(2003).
107. Automobile manufacturers have expressed their intent to challenge the substance of
California's auto emissions laws. Mark Hertsgaard, California Green Light, THE NATION, Aug.
19, 2002, at 7.
108. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 200 § l(b) (A.B. 1493) (West); Hertsgaard, supra note 107, at
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sions standards), may choose to construct their automobiles in compli-
ance with California's standards. California's emissions standards may
therefore set forth a global de facto market emissions standard for all
cars and light-trucks, altering the standards for vehicles worldwide. In
this scenario, the effect of California's emissions laws may not be lim-
ited to the United States. Hence, unilateral domestic legislation aimed at
altering emissions standards, and not the imposition of collective inter-
national action as Posner suggests, may be enough to curb the cata-
strophic effects of global warming.
It is foreseeable, however, that global automobile manufacturers
may find it profitable to produce two separate automobile models: one
built in accordance with California's strict emissions standards and one
built to please the remaining global market. If this does become the
case, then it is still doubtful whether international, collective action will
be effective. Even if an international environmental protection agency
were to be created, it is unclear whether the United States would capitu-
late with the standards imposed by the international agency (think ratifi-
cation of the Kyoto Protocol). The United States would undoubtedly
continue to act in its own domestic interest, for an international environ-
mental protection agency would not have the power to impose enforcea-
ble sanctions upon defiant nations. In other words, given Austin's
positivist view of law - that law is a series of commands by the sover-
eign - the standards imposed by an international environmental protec-
tion agency would have not have the force of law because there would
be no sovereign body capable of enforcement. Thus, there would be no
true grave threat to the United States to induce reduction of greenhouse
emissions; the United States would continue to emit greenhouse gases as
it pleased. This brings me to my point: the only way in which the
United States will reduce its output of carbon dioxide emissions is to
enact strict social policy from within. If automobile manufactures find it
profitable to continue to only produce only one model of each car and
light-truck, then California's strict emissions standards may be enough
to create a de facto domestic standard and begin to abridge the harmful
effects of global warming. On the other hand, if car manufactures pro-
duce two models for each car and light-truck, then it may require federal
legislation, as opposed to Posner's proposed international collective
action, to mitigate the catastrophic risk posed by global warming.
2. THE EXHAUSTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
Loss OF BIODIvERSITY
Posner argues that the exhaustion of natural resources, such as oil,
coal, and water, does not pose a catastrophic risk. Posner contends that
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the price system limits our consumption of natural resources. Notice
that the price system posits that as a good becomes scarcer, the initial
price of the good will rise and people will search for more attractive
substitutes (p. 59). As a result, "the price system will prevent oil, gas, or
coal from running out before there are feasible substitutes" (p. 59).
However, Posner notes that the safeguards of the price system do
not apply to plants or animals without commercial value (p. 60). Simi-
larly, no self-regulating economic process can ensure the survival of
commercial plants and animals (p. 60). Indeed, the exploitation of com-
mercial plants and animals may result in extinction.1°9 Take, for exam-
ple, the conservationist fisherman:
[A] fisherman who limits his catch will not be benefiting himself in
the least. He will just be leaving more fish for his competitors to take
unless he is able to make a legally enforceable agreement with them
to limit the amount of fishing that all do (p. 60).
Alas, the rapid increase in industrialization and urbanization since
the Industrial Revolution has caused widespread destruction of habitats
(p. 63). "[T]here is little doubt that species are going extinct extremely
rapidly and that we are in the midst of a major extinction interval" (p.
64)."1 Although we are not certain as to the potential catastrophic
effect of mass extinction, we may run the risk of suffering an ecological
domino-effect. Genetic diversity is an insurance policy against catastro-
phe resulting from a drastic loss of biodiversity (p. 67). For instance, if
the Dutch elm tree was our only source of wood, there would be a dras-
tic influence on human welfare if Dutch elm disease struck our remain-
ing trees (p. 67).
The catastrophic implications of the loss of biodiversity are cur-
rently unknown. As an alternative to cost-benefit analysis, Posner pro-
poses the use of the tolerable-windows approach.' With respect to the
109. It has been argued, however, that extinction may not necessarily be a bad thing.
"Extinction 'creates space for evolutionary innovations"' (p. 64) (quoting DAVID M. RAUP,
EXTINC'TcON: BAD GENES OR BAD LUCK? 19-20 (1991). Indeed, "extinction is at the heart of the
gale of creative destruction . . . that we call evolution" (p. 61). "Without periodic extinctions
biodiversity would increase exponentially .... Rather soon, the system would saturate: speciation
would have to stop because there would be no room for new species" (p. 64) (quoting RAUP,
supra, at 19-20) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ronald A. Dworkin has argued that law itself is evolutionary in nature. See Ronald A.
Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). Does it logically follow that if
law progresses evolutionary, then nihilism - destruction of the social system for its own sake -
may not necessarily be a bad thing? It is doubtful that this question can be answered in the
affirmative, and as a result, intuitively either: law is not characteristically evolutionary, or
alternatively, extinction of the legal system may not necessarily be a good thing.
110. Quoting Helen M. Regan et al., The Currency and Tempo of Extinction, 157 AM.
NATURALIST 1, 8 (2001).
111. See supra note 69 (discussing the tolerable-windows approach).
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loss of biodiversity, "[since] samples can be preserved at low cost in the
form of frozen seeds that can be resuscitated and made to germinate,
large-scale efforts to preserve biodiversity by tightly limiting human
land uses may not be cost justified" (p. 184). In such an instance, the
marginal benefit derived from limiting human land use may be similar to
preserving frozen samples of specimens. However, the latter can be
adequately accomplished at a much lower marginal cost. An optimal
level of precaution exists at the intersection of marginal cost and margi-
nal benefit; therefore, Posner argues that social policy should be directed
at preserving frozen samples of specimens as opposed to stringent land
use controls (pp. 184-85).
D. Intentional, Man-Made Catastrophe
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks provide an example of
intentional catastrophe; although arguably, Posner believes that the
attacks themselves lead to sub-catastrophic results. While Posner did
not make this explicit point, if there is a case to be made for the applica-
tion of cost-benefit analysis to catastrophic risks, then the application
ought to be made in cases involving intentionally-inflicted, man-made
catastrophic risks (assuming, arguendo, that a relevant probability of
occurrence is discernable). Intentionally-inflicted catastrophic risks are
often given a different treatment than the other catastrophic risks dis-
cussed above. Returning to Posner's discussion of natural catastrophes,
statistically, the average number of deaths from asteroid collisions
greatly exceeds the average number of deaths from airline crashes (p.
121).112 If we isolate social policy as a response to potentially fatal
risks, one would presume that social policy would respond by allocating
more resources to defend against asteroid collisions as opposed to airline
security. 11 3  However, it is readily-apparent that the reverse is true.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, social policy has taken a tough
112. But see WEBB, supra note 52, at 173 (stating that "averaged over a human lifetime, the
chance of being killed by meteorite impact is about the same as dying in an aircraft crash").
113. Tangentially, Posner argues that the:
difference between airline crashes and asteroid collisions, which may not seem
related to probabilities but is, is that one can do something about the risk of being
killed in an airline crash - not fly, or fly less frequently, or fly only on major
airlines - and one cannot do anything about asteroid collisions except write one's
Congressman (p. 122) (emphasis original).
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks caused thousands of casualties on the ground. This may
have altered one's perception (perhaps irrationally) of the risk associated with intentional and
unintentional airline mortality to persons on the ground. See Kimberly M. Thompson et al., The
Risk of Groundling Fatalities from Unintentional Airplane Crashes, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 1025
(2001). If we focus solely on ground mortalities resulting from airplane crashes, the only possible
alternative for persons who fear "death from above" is to move one's abode a reasonable distance
from all flight paths; and even then, that does not meliorate the risk of dying from an intentional,
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stance against man-made catastrophic risks; much tougher than that
against asteroid collisions. Posner accurately points to the cause of this
anomaly. "[P]eople sometimes overreact, from a statistical standpoint, to
a slight risk because it is associated with a particularly vivid, attention-
seizing event" (p. 171). The human mind may be evolutionarily
programmed to react, perhaps irrationally, to salient events - such as the
macabre scene that often results from airline crashes." 4
1. BIOTERRORISM
Posner argues that now more than ever, dangerous biotechnologies
are within the grasp of terrorists, small rogue nations, and sociopaths.
There is a direct correlation between the risk of apocalyptic terrorism
and technological advancement (p. 92). Unfortunately, science and
technology have brought us to the point where a person or group of
persons may have the capability to cause global catastrophe. Hypotheti-
cally, a terrorist group could launch a biological attack if they were:
to obtain a suitable pathogen, engineer it to maximize its lethality and
defeat any existing vaccine, handle it without infecting themselves
before they could complete their work (since they would have no
vaccine protection), aerosolize it - the most difficult stage - and dis-
seminate it (pp. 82-83).'
1 5
Once an airborne pathogen is biologically fabricated, a terrorist could
place it in "aerosolizers that he would unobtrusively deposit in airport
departure lounges, shopping malls, movie theaters, indoor stadiums, and
other enclosed spaces in which people congregate" (p. 79). This invisi-
ble mist would contaminate hundreds of thousands of people, and in
turn, make these people carriers of the airborne pathogen (p. 79).
Within weeks, a pandemic with catastrophic implications could be trig-
terrorist-related airline crash. Indeed, it is not a stretch to presume that the risk associated with
airline mortality on the ground is perceived irrationally greater than that of an asteroid collision.
114. Two forms of terrorism, not extensively discussed in this piece but mentioned in
Catastrophe, are nuclear terrorism and cyberterrorism. The design of nuclear weapons is well-
known, and currently much of the material required to build a nuclear weapon is not adequately
protected against theft or diversion (p. 74). Hypothetically, a terrorist could easily create a crude
nuclear explosive by coating a conventional bomb with radioactive materials to cause extensive
radioactive contamination (p. 74). Similarly, a terrorist could commandeer an airplane and crash
it into a nuclear reactor (p. 74).
Notice that cyberterrorism also poses a catastrophic risk. "The Internet is to the computer
virus as the atmosphere is to an airborne biological virus" (p. 84). The cost of cyberterrorism is
substantial to the United States economy; billions of dollars are spent to prevent cyberterrorism
annually (p. 84). Lone individuals, working with inexpensive equipment, are currently in an arms
race to devise more dangerous viruses to counter current sophisticated defenses (p. 85).
Cyberterrorism could be used to dismantle military computers or to dismantle the World Wide
Web in an effort to trigger a major economic depression (pp. 85-86).
115. Internal citation omitted.
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gered by the release of a fatal, easily-spread bacterium or virus with an
optimal infectious incubation period (p. 75).
Posner maintains that it is readily-apparent that terrorist groups
have a substantial interest in bioterrorism (p. 77).' 6 Although technol-
ogy has undoubtedly played a role in the growing risk of bioterrorism,
there are other influential factors. Posner claims that effective security
measures taken against other terrorist means, such as hijacking air-
planes, have forced terrorists to search for more feasible substitutes,
such as bioterrorism (p. 76). Moreover, bioterrorists may have fluid
objectives and perceive fewer political, ethical, and moral constraints;
consequently, such groups are less easily deterred (p. 76). Furthermore,
bioterrorism may be accomplished by one deranged individual with the
appropriate educational background because information regarding bio-
logical experiments is widely available (p. 76).
Of utmost concern to Posner is the proliferation of potentially dan-
gerous biochemical information. "Several years ago a team of Austra-
lian biologists developed a lethal virus by accident while trying to invent
a contraceptive vaccine for mice as a means of pest control" (p. 78).
Some years later, microbiologists at St. Louis University, while mimick-
ing the Australian team's experiment, created an even more lethal virus
than that created by the Australian team (p. 80). What is most alarming
about these experiments is the fact that both teams eventually had their
findings published publicly (pp. 78-80). In effect, these publications
provided "a blueprint for any bioterrorist able to obtain a virus that
causes disease in human beings and might be enhanced by the method
employed by those scientists" (p. 78). Alas, bioresearch that is readily
available to the public may destroy the value of combating terrorism (p.
80).
Thus, combating bioterrorism is a double-edged sword. In order to
combat bioterrorism, we must train biochemists to experiment "on vac-
cines, cures, and other methods of detection" (p. 81). Unfortunately,
116. According to Jessica Stem:
Several incidents before the 2001 anthrax attacks made clear that terrorists have
been interested in acquiring and using [weapons of mass destruction]. Perhaps the
most significant of these was the sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese
cult, on the Tokyo subway in 1995. During the 1990s the cult also attempted to use
biological weapons, apparently unsuccessfully. The U.S. government has
repeatedly stated that Osama bin Laden is interested in acquiring biological agents
. . . . During the last decade, several American antigovernment individuals and
groups were found to have acquired biological agents, revealing gaps in existing
regulations regarding the sale or possession of lethal or incapacitating biological
agents.




there is a direct correlation between the number of people trained in
biochemistry and "the number of people who know how to alter, create,
and distribute such agents" (pp. 81-82). While public disclosure of
research equips potential terrorists with a template for destruction, we
are lucky that bioterrorism has yet to cause mass casualties (p. 99).117
Posner contends that cost-benefit analysis is incomplete with
respect to bioterrorism for the probability of a bioterrorist attack cannot
be ascertained (p. 174). However, we are well aware of the catastrophic
risk posed by bioterrorism, and consequently a social response ought to
be formulated. Posner initially proposes that an international
bioweaponry agency could enforce security measures against the devel-
opment of bioweapons (pp. 218-21). In terms of the efficacy of global
domestic security measures, international cooperation is required to
investigate and apprehend bioterrorists and scientists who fail to observe
proper security precautions (p. 219). Indeed, Posner is correct to assume
that international cooperation is at the crux of the war against bioterror-
ism, for the unilateral regulation of biotechnology results in a prisoner's
dilemma.' I8  However, we return again to the problem of international
enforcement, articulated in the Part II.C.1 discussion regarding global
warming. Regardless, Posner states that there are no uniform safety
standards in biotechnical research, development, and production; nor is
there an international regime for monitoring or enforcing such standards.
Therefore:
117. It is unclear as to why bioterrorism has not already been employed. Perhaps bioterrorists
have not attained the prerequisite biotechnology to carry out such an attack (p. 83). Perhaps
bioterrorists are worried that a pandemic would wipe out the entire human population, including
their loved ones (p. 83).
118. The prisoner's dilemma is:
[a] paradigmatic, two-person, two-strategy normal form game of complete but
imperfect information. In this game, the strategy combination that is in the joint
interests of the players (to remain silent in response to a prosecutor's questions) is
not played, because each player finds that the strategy of remaining silent is strictly
dominated by the other strategy (confessing).
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 312 (1994) (emphasis omitted). The
prisoner's dilemma exists when "collective action problems in the law in which individual self-
interest leads to actions that are not in the interest of the group as a whole." Id. at 312-13. The
prisoner's dilemma evident in attempts to minimize the expected cost of catastrophic risks posed
by bioterrorism is inherently systemic; indeed, self-interested nations will not take into account
the potential greater payoff of international cooperation. Accordingly, self-interested nations will
not take unilateral, domestic safety-measures against dangerous biotechnical research because it
will induce, rather than discourage, other countries to take part in the same research (p. 186).
Arguably, however, if all nations were to contract with one another collectively, each nation
would receive a greater payoff and the world would be a much safer place to be. The prisoner's
dilemma therefore results because self-interested nations will continue to act rationally by
permitting biotechnical research and will probably be worse off than if they had acted irrationally.
For an in-depth analysis of the prisoner's dilemma, see Robert Birmingham, Remarks, 29 CONN.
L. REv. 827 (1997).
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fain agency is needed that will reduce the risk of bioterrorism... by
establishing, and verifying compliance with, standards for (1) secur-
ing such [biotechnology] facilities, (2) denying access by dangerous
people to lethal pathogens and to the training, facilities, and knowl-
edge required to create bioweaponry, and (3) regulating the publica-
tion of research involving such substances (pp. 219-20).
Posner thus postulates that unless bioterrorism is internationally regu-
lated, any efforts by the United States to regulate bioterrorism may be
fruitless.
Posner also argues that social policy should be aimed at limiting the
study of potentially dangerous sciences by foreigners. Posner does not
claim that citizens of foreign nations should be completely banned from
studying dangerous sciences in the United States. A purely domestic,
unilateral move would be ineffective. Foreigners would attend universi-
ties in nations that do not regulate the study of dangerous sciences (p.
222). Such an abrasive restriction could also potentially damage foreign
relations and weaken universities (p. 222). Consequently, Posner does
not advocate a complete ban on the study of dangerous sciences by for-
eigners; rather, the existing domestic policy limiting access to the most
lethal pathogens and toxins is sufficient (p. 222). As a result, Posner
believes that present domestic policy grants foreigners an adequate
opportunity to study biology and other natural sciences. (p. 223).
2. TERRORISM, IN GENERAL
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks illustrate the destructive
power of terrorism. According to Posner, harsh criminal sanctions
should be imposed for perpetrators of terrorism. Criminal sanctions,
under an economic analysis, are generally deterrent strategies, aimed at
internalizing the cost of crime in the ex ante decision-making process. 19
Posner believes that under our current regime, criminal sanctions may
not be adequately deterring terrorism. In response, Posner contends that
criminal law ought to shift from an exclusively deterrent strategy to a
mixed deterrent-prophylactic strategy (p. 226). To accomplish this goal
Posner supports the application of harsh criminal sanctions, including
extended prison sentences and the possibility of reprisals against family
members of terrorists as a form of collective punishment (p. 235). With
respect to the latter, it is a possibility that terrorists may derive utility
from the well-being of family members; indeed, the utility of family
members may be embedded in a terrorist's utility function. Also, collec-
tive punishment imparts an incentive on family members to try to pre-
119. See Becker, supra note 38, at 39-85 (arguing that the internalization of criminal sanctions
requires that "crime does not pay" to the criminal).
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vent potential terrorists from carrying out attacks (pp. 234-35). This
incentive-based reasoning, while increasing the expected cost of terrorist
activity, has struck scholars such as Daryl J. Levinson as unattractive.
More specifically, Levinson has objected to communal sanctions
because "[1]iberal conceptions of morality insist that agency and respon-
sibility be attributed only to individuals, not groups."1 20 Levinson's arti-
cle relies on liberalism, as opposed to the economic analysis, and
demonstrates that the two schools of thought can sometimes support
contradictory social policy measures.
Posner further argues that extreme police measures could be imple-
mented to curtail possible terrorist threats. "[I]n the wake of 9/11, there
is growing interest in extreme police measures as a response to extreme
risks" (p. 234). Take, for instance, the Patriot Act, which has included
measures such as a "relaxed standard for eavesdropping on conversa-
tions between a criminal defendant and his lawyer, the detention of non-
citizens on secret charges, increased power to monitor email traffic, eas-
ier access to certain private records, and liberalized use of secret war-
rants" (p. 234). The Patriot Act, as an extreme police measure, improves
our ability to minimize the risk of terrorism. Civil libertarians argue that
the imposition of extreme police measure may lead to political catastro-
phe. Posner dismisses this possibility by stating that "[t]here must be
some room for curtailing the current, historically unprecedented extent
of those liberties without precipitating a political catastrophe" (p. 238).
Indeed, the Patriot Act's restrictions on civil liberties are mild in com-
parison to those imposed as a response to the Red Scare of the 1950s (p.
234). By implication, Posner argues that civil libertarians should be
worrying less about our civil liberties, and more about what would hap-
pen if another September llth occurred (p. 242). "Before 9/11, the
American Civil Liberties Union opposed the screening of airline passen-
gers who traveled to countries that sponsored terrorism. It is conceiva-
ble that such screening would have prevented the 9/11 attacks - and the
restrictions on civil liberties that ensued in reaction to those attacks" (p.
242). 121
CONCLUSION
Richard A. Posner, in Catastrophe: Risk and Response, bridges the
gap between law and science in his discussion of a number of cata-
strophic risks. Utilizing cost-benefit analysis and some derivatives
thereof, Posner proffers a series of hypothetical regulatory responses to
catastrophic risks. Cost-benefit analysis, while sometimes imperfect in
120. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 348 (2003).
121. Citations omitted.
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evaluating domestic policy, is extremely helpful in curtailing the politi-
cal, psychological, economic, and cultural misconceptions that accom-
pany catastrophe. Noting that natural catastrophes pose a cognizable
risk, Posner argues that science and technology, both increasing at an
enormous rate, are also capable of producing colossal harm. Sadly, our
current domestic policy with respect to "asteroid collisions, global
warming, biodiversity loss, and the other accidental doomsday dangers
is, with exception of natural pandemics and the partial exception of
global warming, essentially one of ignoring them" (p. 221). Indeed, it
currently appears that the American public only cares about "social
issues of far less intrinsic significance, such as race relations, whether
homosexual marriage should be permitted, the size of the federal deficit,
drug addiction, and child pornography" (pp. 92-93). Posner's Catastro-
phe, as a truly insightful and lucid work, pushes the reader to understand
the terrifying dangers posed by catastrophe without emitting an aura of
prophecy or inevitability. The work is a significant step toward efficient
and effective domestic policy responses to catastrophic risks. All things
considered, Posner, as the anti-prognosticator, should be commended for
his rational economic evaluation of catastrophic risks.
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